Real Estate, Land Use and Environmental Law Blog - Up-to-date information on Real Estate, Land Use and Environmental Law

Hines v. California Coastal Commission, No. A125254 (1st Dist. June 17, 2010)

By Michael Wilmar and Alex Merritt

In Hines v. California Coastal Commission, the First District Court of Appeal upheld the Coastal Commission’s determination that an appeal raised no substantial issue under the California Coastal Act, and went so far as to state in dicta that even if a development were technically inconsistent with a Local Coastal Program ("LCP"), the Commission could still reject an appeal of the approval of that development as not presenting a substantial issue.

City of Santee v. County of San Diego, No. D055310 (4th Dist. June 7, 2010)

By Michael Wilmar and Alex Merritt

Last month the California Court of Appeal for the Fourth District provided important guidance on the issue of when approval of an agreement affecting a development constitutes approval of a “project” that requires review under the California Environmental Quality Act ("CEQA"). In City of Santee v. County of San Diego, the Fourth District held that a siting agreement between the County of San Diego and the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation ("DCR") for a state prison facility did not commit the County to a definite course of action, and therefore did not constitute a project approval requiring CEQA review. The court reached this conclusion after noting that the agreement did not preclude any alternatives or mitigation measures, and that implementation of the agreement was contingent on a number of factors, including future environmental review.

Stop the Beach Renourishment, Inc. v. Florida Department of Environmental Protection, et al., 560 U. S. _(June 17, 2010)

By Michael Wilmar & Aaron Kleven

On June 17, 2010, the Supreme Court unanimously ruled that the State of Florida did not infringe on private property interests by engaging in a beach preservation effort. But though the participating justices agreed on the decision (Justice Stevens did not participate), they disagreed sharply on a point of constitutional law underlying the complaint.

Walgreen Co. v. City and County of San Francisco, No. A123891 (June 8, 2010)

By Brenna Moorhead

Walgreen Co. prevailed against the City and County of San Francisco in California court and can proceed with its challenge to San Francisco’s ordinance banning the sale of tobacco products at certain retail establishments that contain a pharmacy. San Francisco defined "pharmacy" as "a retail establishment in which the profession of pharmacy by a [licensed] pharmacist is practiced and where prescription drugs are offered for sale." The prohibition applied to a store as a whole, even if the licensed pharmacy was situated within a larger store selling other merchandise. Thus, the ordinance would have included drugstores, grocery stores, chain stores, supermarkets, and big box stores that contain a pharmacy. However, San Francisco elected to exclude general grocery stores and big box stores.

Stockton Citizens for Sensible Planning v. City of Stockton _____ Cal. ___ (April 1, 2010, No. S159690)

By Phillip Tate

On April 1, 2010, the California Supreme Court unanimously ruled that flaws in the decision making process underlying a facially valid and properly filed Notice of Exemption ("NOE") do not prevent the NOE from triggering a 35-day statute of limitations period for challenging the agency's determination under the California Environmental Quality Act ("CEQA"). The decision ended a lawsuit challenging the approval of a Wal-Mart Supercenter in Stockton, California (the "City"). In overturning the lower courts, the Supreme Court held that when an NOE minimally complies with CEQA, it is sufficient to trigger the 35-day statute of limitations under CEQA. and a plaintiff can not argue the merits of the underlying approval as a means of circumventing the statute of limitations.

Patricia Melom v. City of Madera, __ Cal. App. __ (March, 24, 2010, No. MCV037258)

By Phillip Tate

Retail "supercenters" do not automatically trigger the need to study urban decay effects in an environmental impact report ("EIR"). Rather, the project or the change in the project should be the focus of the inquiry as to whether additional study is needed, and not the type of retail store.

By Claudia Gutierrez

The Alameda County Superior Court recently invalidated the housing cap in a voter-approved measure limiting the number of residences that could be built in the City of Pleasanton, California. The court also noted that the City's planning process, as well as its planning documents, were flawed and inadequate in multiple ways. Continue Reading Questions & comments

By Claudia Gutierrez

Communities for a Better Environment v. South Coast Air Quality Management District et al. ___Cal.__) (March 15, 2010; Case No. S161190)

In this case, the Supreme Court of California held that neither the statute of limitations, the principles of vested rights, nor the CEQA case law on which ConocoPhillips relied, justified employing the maximum capacity allowed under prior equipment permits as an analytical baseline for a new project, rather than the physical conditions actually existing at the time of the analysis. The court therefore concluded that the South Coast Air Quality Management District (District) abused its discretion in determining ConocoPhillips' proposed project would have no significant environmental effects compared to a baseline of maximum permitted capacity. Continue Reading Questions & comments

Committee for Green Foothills v. Santa Clara County Board of Supervisors, __ Cal.4th __ (February 2, 2010, No. S163680)("Green Foothills")

By Robyn Christo

On February 11, 2010, the California Supreme Court unanimously decided that a lead agency's filing of a Notice of Determination ("NOD") sets off the 30-day statute of limitations (found in Public Resources Code section 21167, subdivisions (b), (c) and (e)) for all California Environmental Quality Act ("CEQA") lawsuits brought to challenge the decision announced in the NOD.

By James Pugh & Dave Lanferman

On October 22, 2009, the California Supreme Court decided not to review the Court of Appeal's decision in the landmark Palmer/Sixth Street Properties v. City of Los Angeles case. [See SMRH Blog 08/18/2009, for detailed discussion of Palmer decision.] This decision, although favorable for Palmer, could launch "inclusionary zoning" and similar affordable housing laws across the state into uncertain legal waters as municipalities attempt to enforce now-questionable inclusionary zoning requirements.

By Robert Uram & Keith Garner

On September 2, 2009, the State Water Resources Control Board (“State Board”) adopted a new General Permit for Discharges of Storm Water Associated with Construction Activities (“CGP”) that imposes significant new and potentially burdensome requirements for discharging storm water from construction sites. The CGP would apply to all construction activities disturbing one or more acres of land or to smaller areas that are part of a common plan for development, as well as to construction activities related to linear overhead/underground projects, which were previously covered under a separate general permit. Unless the CGP is challenged and set aside, the new permit will become effective on July 1, 2010, allowing current dischargers to get through the 2009-2010 rainy season before the new standards go into effect.

Weisblat, et al., v. City of San Diego, ___ Cal. App. 4th ____ (Aug. 18, 2009, No. D052787)

By Jeffrey W. Forrest and David P. Lanferman

In 1997, in an attempt to clarify the sometimes blurry distinction between a government “fee” and a government “tax,” the California Supreme Court explained that “taxes are imposed for revenue purposes, rather than in return for a specific benefit conferred or a privilege granted.” (Sinclair Paint Co. v. State Bd. of Equalization (1997) 15 Cal.4^th 866, 874.) Recently, on August 18, 2009, California’s Court of Appeal for the Fourth Appellate District further clarified the distinction in Weisblat, et al., v. City of San Diego (Super. Ct. No. GIC871893). The issue was whether the City of San Diego’s “Tax Collection Fee” charged to landowners to cover the expense of collecting and administering the City’s rental unit business tax was, in fact, a general tax. The court held that it was a general tax because the purpose of the Tax Collection Fee was not to provide a government service to landlords (such as building inspection), but rather to facilitate the City’s general tax collection efforts (processing rental tax applications, answering taxpayer questions, and generating and mailing out billing statements to collect the rental tax). As a general tax, the court voided the Tax Collection Fee because the City Council levied it in 2004 without approval of a majority of qualified voters in the City as required by the California Constitution. The City’s underlying rental unit business tax, which was established in 1942 and generates $11 million annually, was not challenged and remains in effect.

by James Pugh

On July 22, 2009, the California Court of Appeals issued a ruling that could send California’s affordable housing laws into a tailspin. The case is Palmer/Sixth Street Properties, L.P., et al., v. City of Los Angeles, and it questioned whether cities can impose mandatory affordable housing, also known as inclusionary zoning, requirements on the development of market-rate apartment projects. The Second Appellate District Court believes not.

By David P. Lanferman & Jeffrey W. Forrest

On July 15, 2009, the Governor signed new "urgency" legislation to automatically extend the life of existing tentative subdivision maps, vesting tentative maps ("VTMs") and parcel maps for two additional years -- provided that they were still valid and in effect on July 15, and would otherwise expire before January 1, 2012. The new law, AB 333 (Fuentes) (Stats. 2009, ch. 18), included urgency provisions so that it took effect immediately upon signature by the Governor. The urgency of this measure, intended to preserve the many approved projects which were otherwise in danger of map expiration and loss of valuable rights, was apparently recognized so that it was able to receive the Governor's signature notwithstanding the hold on most other new legislation pending resolution of the State budget situation.

Health First v. March Joint Powers Authority (Tesco Stores West, Inc.), ___ Cal. App. 4th ___ (June 10, 2009, No. RIC458367)

By Katharine E. Allen

The California Court of Appeal for the Fourth Appellate District determined that the act of reviewing and approving a design permit application for a warehouse facility by the March Joint Powers Authority (the "Authority") in accordance with the Specific Plan for the March Business Center constituted a ministerial act and thus did not require further environmental review under the California Environmental Quality Act ("CEQA"). In reversing the trial court's holding on this issue, the Court of Appeal emphasized the Authority's use of fixed standards and objectives embodied in a checklist for conformance with certain Design Guidelines established under the Specific Plan and the lack of any discretionary or subjective judgment in granting approval. The Court of Appeals also briefly addressed lesser issues relating to the application of certain mitigation measures called for in the Specific Plan to the development of the facility and the standing of the plaintiff in the trial court.

BIACC v. City of Patterson (2009) 171 Cal.App.4th 886

By David P. Lanferman

On June 17, 2009, the California Supreme Court denied the City of Patterson's petition for review of the Court of Appeals decision invalidating the City of Patterson's "affordable housing in lieu fees" and holding that the City violated a development agreement by demanding the new fees from the approved project. The Fifth Appellate District had initially issued its unanimous decision in January, holding that the City had failed to demonstrate that the amount of its new $22,000 per market-rate home fee was reasonably related to any deleterious impacts on the community's need for affordable housing. The appellate court later denied the City's petition for rehearing, slightly modified the text of its decision, and ordered the decision to be published in March. The Supreme Court's recent ruling means the decision now stands as "final" (at least as to the California judicial system).

California Oak Foundation v. County of Tehama et al. (Del Webb California Corp. et al.), ____ Cal. App. 4th ____ (June 11, 2009, No. CI58258)

By Katharine E. Allen

Four letters sent to the County of Tehama and the Tehama County Board of Supervisors (collectively “Tehama”) and disclosed to real parties in interest by a law firm retained as outside counsel for the purpose of providing advice on compliance with the California Environmental Quality Act (“CEQA”) maintained their privileged status under the attorney-client and work product privileges despite the disclosure and thus did not need to be included in the administrative record. In so holding, the Court of Appeal for the Third Appellate District relied on the common interest doctrine to maintain the privileged status of the letters. The court did, however, reverse the judgment of the Superior Court of Tehama County on a separate issue related to the investigation of the financial feasibility of certain mitigation fees, with directions that the superior court enter a judgment requiring Tehama to reconsider the standard used in determining the economic feasibility of the underlying project.

Building Industry Association of Central California v. City of Patterson (2009) __ Cal App. 4th ____

By David P. Lanferman

The Court of Appeal for the Fifth Appellate District certified its decision in Building Industry Association of Central California v. City of Patterson for publication on March 2, 2009. The court had previously issued an opinion on Jan. 30, 2009, holding that the City of Patterson’s “affordable housing in lieu fee” was invalid, because the amount of the fee was not shown to be reasonably related to costs of the City’s affordable housing program attributable to new development, as required by the terms of a statutory development agreement between the City and the developer. (See previous Affordable Housing in Lieu Fees blog article). The City had increased the fee to $20,946 from its previous rate of $734 per new residential building permit. The development agreement with the homebuilder permitted the City to impose increased fees if they were “reasonably justified,” and the City argued that this language permitted the increased fees. The Court of Appeal held that (1) the contractual limitation incorporated the legal standards generally applicable to development impact fees and exactions; (2) the fees in this case were therefore not free from a “meaningful means ends review”; and (3) the City had failed to show that its new fees met those standards.

By David P. Lanferman

“Affordable housing in lieu fees” imposed by the City of Patterson on new residential development projects were invalidated by the California Court of Appeal for the Fifth Appellate District, in an unpublished decision issued on January 30, 2008.  (Building Industry Association of Central California v. City of Patterson).  The court unanimously held that the amount of the City’s housing in lieu fee (nearly $21,000 per home) was not calculated in conformity with “the legal standards generally applicable to development fees,” and that the fees were therefore not “reasonably justified” as required by the terms of a development agreement.  The court invalidated the fee, awarded costs to the plaintiffs, and remanded the case to the lower court with directions to determine an appropriate remedy for the City’s imposition of unjustified and invalid fees. 

By Olivier F. Theard and Bram Hanono

In a significant step towards achieving required reductions in greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions, the California Air Resources Board (CARB) approved the AB 32 Climate Change Scoping Plan on December 11, 2008 (Res. 08-47).  CARB Chairperson Mary Nichols described the Scoping Plan as "California's prospectus for a more secure and sustainable economy."

Save Tara v City of West Hollywood, ___ Cal. 4th ___ (Oct. 30, 2008, Case No. S151402)

By David Collins

In this case, the California Supreme Court invalidated agreements by the City of West Hollywood (“City”) for a housing project that was conditioned on future environmental review.  The court avoided establishing a bright-line rule that would define CEQA approvals as either entering into any agreement for development of a well-defined project, or the execution of unconditional agreements that irrevocably vest development rights.  Instead it articulated the general principle that before conducting CEQA review, agencies must not take any action that significantly furthers a project in a manner that forecloses alternatives or mitigation measures that would ordinarily be part of CEQA review of the project.  Surrounding circumstances along with the agency’s agreements should be evaluated by the courts when applying this general principle.  To assist in making the determination, the court set forth a two-step approach: (i) whether the agency, in taking action indicates it will perform environmental review before making any further commitment to the project, and if so, whether the agency nevertheless limits its discretion regarding environmental review; and (ii) whether the record shows the agency committed significant resources to shape the project and thereby foreclosed consideration of meaningful alternatives.

By Rafael F. Muilenburg, James E. Pugh, and Michael Hansen

On September 30, 2008, the rules governing regional planning changed dramatically when Governor Schwarzenegger signed Senate Bill No. 375 ("SB 375") into law. SB 375, in its essence, attempts to control greenhouse gas ("GHG") emissions by curbing urban sprawl through the implementation of "sustainable community strategies" in land use and transportation planning, along with various related incentives relating to housing development.

By Ella Foley-Gannon and James Rusk

Responding to an order from the Orange County Superior Court, the State Water Resources Control Board (the “State Board”) has lifted a two-week-old moratorium on new construction in the Los Angeles region.  The State Board announced on Friday that it would resume processing new enrollments under the statewide NPDES Construction General Storm Water Permit (the “Construction General Permit”) and other statewide NPDES permits.  The State Board had suspended such enrollments just two weeks earlier, in response to a writ of mandate issued by the court in the Arcadia II litigation.  However, the court clarified on Friday that the writ does allow the State Board to implement the terms of NPDES permits, so long as those terms are not used to enforce numeric water quality standards.

Witt Home Ranch, Inc. v. County of Sonoma (July 29, 2008, Case No. A118911 __ Cal.App.4th ___

By Misty Calder

Plaintiff Witt Home Ranch, Inc. (“Ranch”) argued that a 1915 subdivision map qualified under a statutory grandfather provision, section 66499.30(d) of the Government Code, which recognizes antiquated subdivision maps that were recorded in compliance with “[l]aws . . . regulating the design and improvement of subdivisions” in effect at the time of the map’s recordation.  The Ranch also argued that the County’s conduct during the application process violated its constitutional right to due process.  The California Court of Appeal upheld the trial court ruling that the laws governing subdivision maps in 1915 did not regulate the “design and improvement of subdivisions,” as required by the grandfather clause, and that the County did not violate the Ranch’s right to due process.

By Ella Foley-Gannon and James Rusk

The State Water Resources Control Board (the “State Board”) has effectively imposed a moratorium on new construction within the Los Angeles region, in response to the Orange County Superior Court’s recent ruling in the Arcadia II litigation.  The State Board last week published two memoranda interpreting a writ of mandate issued on July 2 in the Arcadia II case, which involves a challenge to the storm water quality standards set forth in the Basin Plan for the Los Angeles Region.  According to the memoranda, the writ requires the State Board to stop processing enrollments under the statewide Construction General Storm Water Permit.  This interpretation will halt virtually all new construction projects that have not already obtained storm water permit coverage.  The State Board also has interpreted the writ as prohibiting any approvals or other actions to implement new TMDLs for receiving waters in the Los Angeles Region.

By Dave Lanferman

Silicon Valley Taxpayers Ass’n v. Santa Clara County Open Space Authority (July 14, 2006, Case No. S136468) ___ Cal.4^th ___.

The California Supreme Court declared that Proposition 218 “changed the law governing assessments” in this unanimous decision issued on July 14, 2008, and applied the “new law” to invalidate assessments levied by a special district to fund the acquisition of unspecified “open space.” The opinion lays out the new rules for the establishment, and judicial review, of assessments under the new substantive and procedural standards mandated by Proposition 218. Since these new requirements were added to the State constitution (Articles XIII C and D), the Court explained that the determination of the validity of an assessment “is now a constitutional question” subject to a more rigorous “independent judgment” standard of judicial review. The Court held that Prop. 218 shifted the burden of proof to the assessing agency. Then, applying its “independent judgment,” the Court found the agency had not met its burden of proof and these open space assessments were fatally deficient in at least two respects: (a) the assessments did not meet the new requirements that they be limited to “special benefits” enjoyed by the assessed properties; and (b) the assessments did not meet the new requirements that the amounts assessed to parcels be “proportional” to the special benefits conferred on the assessed properties.

By Dave Lanferman & Jeffrey Forrest

“Urgency” legislation to automatically extend the life of existing tentative maps, vesting tentative maps (“VTMs”) and parcel maps (so long as the map was valid on July 15, 2008, and would otherwise expire before January 1, 2011) for an additional year was approved by the Legislature and Governor on July 15^th. The new law, SB 1185 (Lowenthal) (Stats. 2008, ch. 124), included urgency provisions so that it took effect immediately upon passage and signature by the Governor.  This automatic extension is in addition to any other extension provided by the Subdivision Map Act or local ordinance.  The bill also authorizes local governments to approve an additional year of discretionary extensions to the life of a tentative map, up to a total of six years (from the current five‑year limit).

Significantly, this legislation also extends the life of other existing state agency approvals that pertain to a development project included in a map extended by this bill.  However, the legislation does not extend the life of local agency project approvals (other than tentative or parcel map approvals), and developers, lenders, and others therefore need to be careful that such local agency approvals or entitlements do not expire and render moot the benefits of the automatic tentative map extension.

Sunset Skyranch Pilots Association v. County of Sacramento (July 2, 2008, C055224) ___ Cal.App.4th ___

By Misty Calder

In this case, Sacramento County (“County”) denied renewal of a conditional use permit (“CUP”) needed for the continued operation of a privately-owned, public-use airport.  The trial court held that (1) denial of the CUP renewal did not constitute a “project” under the California Environmental Quality Act (“CEQA”); and (2) denial of the CUP renewal was not preempted by or violative of the State Aeronautics Act (“SAA”).  The Court of Appeal reversed as to the CEQA claim, holding that denial of the CUP would have the practical effect of closing the airport, and airport closure had the potential to cause significant environmental impacts.  Therefore, notwithstanding section 15270 of the CEQA Guidelines, the closure of the airport was a “project” under CEQA and not exempt from environmental review under CEQA.

SCOPE v. County of Los Angeles (November 26, 2007, B189116) 157 Cal. App. 4th 149

By Maria Pracher and Misti Schmidt

The California Court of Appeal for the Second District recently issued the first appellate opinion to apply the four principles delineated by the California Supreme Court in Vineyard Area Citizens for Responsible Growth, Inc. v. City of Rancho Cordova, 40 Cal. 4th 412 ("Vineyard").  These principles govern whether the water services discussion in an Environmental Impact Report ("EIR") sufficiently analyzes the availability of future water supplies.  Santa Clarita Organization for Planning the Environment, et al.,  v. County of Los Angeles, 157 Cal. App. 4th 149, Civil No. B189116 at 9 (November 26, 2007) ("SCOPE").  Briefly, the Vineyard principles are:

Douda v. California Coastal Commission (February 6, 2008, B188210) ___ Cal.App.4th ___

By Aaron Foxworthy

The Second Appellate District affirmed a lower court decision that when acting as the issuing agency for a Coastal Development Permit (CDP) application, the California Coastal Commission may designate a portion of the subject property as an Environmentally Sensitive Habitat Area (ESHA) during consideration of the CDP application.  And, the Commission may then reject the CDP application based in part on potential impacts to the newly designated ESHA.  The decision is a cautionary tale for parties seeking to develop – or purchase for development – property in the Coastal Zone, that the Commission retains broad authority to designate ESHAs and restrict development.

Security National Guaranty, Inc. v. California Coastal Commission (January 25, 2008, A114647)  ___ Cal. App.4^th ___

The First Appellate District held that the California Coastal Commission does not have the authority to designate property an "environmentally sensitive habitat area" (ESHA) where a certified Local Coastal Program (LCP) is in place, and the LCP has neither designated the property as an ESHA, nor contains language anticipating later designation of the property as an ESHA through administrative action.  The decision stands to protect developers and local governments by recognizing the LCP as a bulwark against the uncertainty created by potential ESHA determinations rendered by the Coastal Commission in the appeals process.

Environmental Defense Project of Sierra County v. County of Sierra, et al. (January 9, 2008, C055448) __Cal. App. 4th

In a victory for public participation advocacy groups and a defeat to efforts to increase efficiency in the planning and development process, the California Court of Appeals for the Third District struck down Sierra County’s “streamlined zoning process,” which had permitted the county to provide notice of a legislative public hearing on a zoning ordinance or zoning ordinance amendment before the legislative body received a planning commission recommendation.  The court held that, under California Government Code sections 65854, 65856, 65090, and 65094, the local agency must give notice of the legislative body’s public hearing on a zoning ordinance or zoning ordinance amendment only after the planning commission has submitted its recommendation to the legislative body, and the public notice must contain the planning commission’s recommendation.

Lincoln Place Tenants Assoc. v. City of Los Angeles (September 19, 2007, B193235 [2^nd Dist. , Div. 7]) ___ Cal. App. 4^th ____; http://www.courtinfo.ca.gov/cgi-bin/opinions

By Alexis M. Pelosi

In this case, the Second District Court of Appeal confirmed that the Ellis Act does not preempt CEQA and that cities have a continuing obligation to comply with mitigation measures required under CEQA.

By Maria Pracher and William Fleishhacker

On August 21, 2007, the California State Legislature ended a 52?day budget stalemate, agreeing to a $145 billion spending plan.  As part of that agreement, the lawmakers passed minor amendments to the California Environmental Quality Act (“CEQA”).  The amendments require the State Office of Planning and Research to develop and prepare guidelines addressing the analysis and feasible mitigation of greenhouse gas emissions, as required by CEQA.  These guidelines must be adopted by the Resources Agency by January 1, 2010.  The amendments also provide an exemption for certain projects from CEQA lawsuits based on claims that the effects of greenhouse gas emissions were not adequately analyzed or mitigated in an Environmental Impact Report (“EIR”) or other CEQA document prepared for the project.  The projects exempted are any transportation or flood protection projects funded by the $25 billion bond measures passed by the voters in 2006.  The CEQA exemptions are temporary, expiring on January 1, 2010.

By William M. Fleishhacker

In Mani Brothers Real Estate Group v. City of Los Angeles, the Second District Court of Appeal of California addressed the issue of whether the City of Los Angeles (the “City”) and the Los Angeles Community Redevelopment Agency (the “CRA”) properly relied on a 2005 Addendum to a 1989 environmental impact report (“EIR”) in approving a modified project. In doing so, the Court specifically rejected the analysis of a 2006 case which held that the initial inquiry should focus on whether the changes amount to a “new project” requiring an EIR.  Rather, under the substantial evidence standard of review, and based on CEQA and the CEQA Guidelines, the Court held that the proper question is whether the changes result in new significant impacts compared to the original project.

Muzzy Ranch Co. v. Solano County Airport Land Use Commission (2007) __ Cal. __

By Arthur J. Friedman, David P. Lanferman and Elizabeth S. Anderson

In Muzzy Ranch Co. v. Solano County Airport Land Use Commission, the California Supreme Court unanimously held that the adoption of the Travis Air Force Base Land Use Plan (the "Plan") by the Solano County Airport Land Use Commission (the "Commission") was a "project" for purposes of CEQA.  In this particular case, however, the Court affirmed the Commission's determination that the adoption of the Plan was exempt from CEQA pursuant to the "common sense" exemption since the Plan simply reiterated existing Solano County General Plan land use policies.  This decision is significant in that the Court: (1) upheld the use of the "common sense" exemption from CEQA review, even though "legitimate questions were raised" about the possible environmental impacts of the adoption of the Plan and the Commission had erred by failing to identify substantial evidence in the record in support of its invocation of the exemption; and (2) also acknowledged that CEQA may require lead agencies to consider the effects of "displaced development" resulting from restrictive land use policies where such development can be reasonably anticipated.

LT-WR, L.L.C. v. California Coastal Commission et al, No. B187666 (Cal. Ct. App., 2d Dist. May 25, 2007)

By Jeffrey W. Forrest

The Second District Court of Appeal of California upheld a trial court decision that the California Coastal Commission (the “Commission”) exceeded its authority when the Commission denied a private landowner a permit for gates and “no trespassing” signs.  The appellate court found that the Commission’s ruling that there was a “potential” to establish prescriptive rights for public use on the property “speculative.”

Like “squatter’s rights”, prescriptive access rights are created when the public openly and repeatedly accesses private property for a sufficient period of time without the landowner’s permission.  The Commission’s denial of the permit in effect decreed the existence of such access rights and was inappropriate because the Coastal Act does not grant the Commission the authority to create prescriptive public access rights.  Only a court has the authority to adjudicate and determine whether prescriptive access rights exist.

By Arthur J. Friedman

On May 22, 2007, the Napa County Superior Court issued its ruling in American Canyon Community United for Responsible Growth et al. v. City of American Canyon et al. (Napa County Superior Court Case No. 26-27462), approving the City’s “addendum” to the previously approved mitigated negative declaration, and thereby authorizing the partially constructed and approved Wal-Mart supercenter in American Canyon to proceed with construction and operations.  The court’s ruling is significant in part because it rejected the petitioners’ novel claim that the City was required to perform “supplemental” environmental review of the project’s potential impacts on climate change in response to the California legislature’s recent enactment of Assembly Bill 32.

Feduniak et al., v. California Coastal Commission (2007) 148 Cal. App. 4th 1346.

By Michael R. Leake

The Sixth District Court of Appeals of California overturned a trial court decision and rejected the claim of a Monterey County coastal property homeowner that the Commission should be estopped from requiring the removal of a three-hole, pitch-and-putt golf course from the property and restoration of the area to its original landscape of native dune vegetation because the Commission failed to take any action regarding the existence of the golf course in violation of restrictions placed on the property by the Commission despite the fact that the golf course was easily visible and had been there for 18 years.

Friends Of The Sierra Railroad v. Tuolumne Park and Recreation District  (filed January 12, 2007; certified for publication February 8, 2007, F050117) __ Cal.App.4^th__

By Lori Wider

Introduction

In this case plaintiff Friends of the Sierra Railroad (Friends) challenged the approval and sale of land from Tuolumne Park and Recreation District (District) to Tuolumne Band of Me-Wuk Indians (Real Party).  The land sold contained a portion of an historic railroad right?of?way.  Friends contended that the sale constituted a “project” under CEQA, requiring prior environmental review.  The Court of Appeal held that the transfer of the land was not a “project” under CEQA under the circumstances of this case.  While some development of the property was reasonably foreseeable, review of possible impacts to the historical resource would be premature in the absence of any specific proposal for development.

Uphold Our Heritage v. Town of Woodside  (filed January 10, 2007; certified for publication February 2, 2007, A113376) __ Cal.App.4^th__

By Lori Wider

Introduction

In this case plaintiff Uphold Our Heritage (Heritage) challenged the issuance by the Town of Woodside (Town) of a permit to Steve Jobs (Jobs) to demolish a mansion on his property to enable construction of a new single family residence.  The Court of Appeal held that Town's findings of infeasibility of certain EIR project alternatives involving rehabilitation of the existing structure rather than demolition were not supported by substantial evidence in the record. While the estimated costs of restoration of the mansion were before the Town Council (Council), the record was devoid of any information regarding the likely cost of a new residence (the proposed project). Without the information necessary to compare the restoration costs against the cost of the project, there was insufficient evidence to support the findings of infeasibility of rehabilitation alternatives.

McAllister v.County of Monterey et al.  (January 31, 2007, H028813) __ Cal.App.4^th__

By Lori Wider

Introduction

This case involved a challenge by the plaintiff McAllister to approval of a coastal development permit issued to his neighbors ("Real Parties") for a single family residence on the Big Sur coast.  The primary issues addressed by the court were McAllister's arguments that (1) the County of Monterey's ("County") approval of the permit was null and void since a prior owner's violation of conditions of a previously issued development permit for the same property constituted a violation of the County Code and, therefore, divested the County of jurisdiction to approve the permit; and (2) the County violated CEQA by failing to prepare an EIR rather than a mitigated negative declaration in connection with the permit.

Concerned McCloud Citizens v. McCloud Community Services District et al.  (Filed January 2, 2007; certified for publication January 31, 2007, C050811) __ Cal.App.4^th__

By Lori Wider

Introduction and Background

The California Court of Appeal, Third Appellate District, reversed the decision of the trial court  granting a petition for writ of mandate brought to challenge approval of an agreement between the McCloud Community Facilities District ("District") and Nestle Waters North America, Inc. ("Nestle") for the sale and purchase of spring water.  The lower court determined that the District had violated CEQA by failing to conduct environmental review prior to approving the agreement.  The appellate court disagreed, finding that approval of the agreement did not trigger the requirement for environmental review prior to District approval because (a) the agreement was expressly conditioned on future CEQA compliance; and (b) it did not commit the District to a course of action or commit it to issuance of any permits or other entitlements to Nestle.

California Farm Bureau Federation et al. v. California State Water Resources Control Board, (January 17, 2007, C050289) __ Cal.App.4th__ http://www.courtinfo.ca.gov/opinions

By David P. Lanferman and Ella Foley-Gannon

The Court of Appeals for the Third Appellate District has declared that regulatory fee schedules adopted by the State Water Rights Control Board (“Board”) in 2003, imposing new annual fees on holders of water rights permits and licenses are unconstitutional and invalid. The decision was based largely on the court’s finding that the Board failed to demonstrate the requisite “proportionality” between the costs of the Board’s regulatory program and the fees imposed on the targeted fee payors, and addressed several important issues frequently raised in the implementation and litigation of regulatory fees.

Black Hills Investments, Inc. v. Albertson's, Inc. - January 12, 2007

By Thomas B. Snyder

On November 22, 2004, Black Hills entered into a contract to purchase two parcels of real property in a retail shopping center.  At the time of the contract, the two parcels had not yet been created through subdivision of the property.  Black Hills deposited earnest money of $133,000 which was described as non-refundable.  The contracts contained a provision which permitted the seller, Albertson's, to terminate the contract if it failed to obtain the proper governmental approvals for creation of the two parcels.  Black Hills was given no such right.

American Canyon Community United for Responsible Growth v. City of American Canyon et al. (November 17, 2006; certified for partial publication December 18, 2006, A111278) __ Cal.App.4^th__ http://www.courtinfo.ca.gov/opinions

By Lori Wider

In this case, the Court of Appeal determined that the City of American Canyon (“City”) violated CEQA because the City’s determination that project changes would not substantially increase traffic impacts was not supported by substantial evidence and the City failed to proceed in accordance with law by refusing to consider potential extraterritorial urban decay effects of a proposed Wal-Mart supercenter.  The changes would have increased the size of the approved project by 6.5% and added 30 traffic trips.  The Court also determined that the City violated its zoning ordinance by approving the supercenter without approving a major modification application.  Only the CEQA portion of the decision is certified for publication; the last section of the decision, addressing the alleged zoning ordinance violations, is not.

City of Goleta v. Superior Court of Santa Barbara County  (December 21, 2006, S129125) __Cal.App.4th__http://www.courtinfo.ca.gov/opinions

By Maria Pracher

The California Supreme Court has held that the newly incorporated City of Goleta could disapprove a final subdivision map even though the vesting tentative subdivision map had been approved by Santa Barbara County.  Government Code section 66413.5(f), which provides for the mandatory approval of a final map by a newly incorporated city if the vesting tentative map has been approved by a county, did not apply given the facts in this case.  Additionally, the City's adoption of the County codes did not prevent it from denying the map, and nothing in the City's actions with respect to the project estopped it from denying the final map.

Calvert v. County of Yuba (December 5, 2006, C047857)__Cal.App.4^th__ http://www.courtinfo.ca.gov/opinions/

By Lori Wider

The Court of Appeal, Third Appellate District, held that a vested rights determination under the Surface Mining and Reclamation Act ("SMARA") regarding surface mining operations in the diminishing asset context is subject to the procedural due process requirements for reasonable notice and an opportunity to be heard.  The County of Yuba ("County") in this case made a determination that Western Aggregates LLC ("Western") had a vested right to mine aggregate from an area within the Yuba Goldfields.  The County had invited Western and other surface mining operators to apply for a vested rights determination following a decision by a superior court in a prior lawsuit that a zoning authorization was not an adequate substitute for a SMARA permit.  In determining that a public adjudicatory hearing, with reasonable notice and an opportunity to be heard, was required, the Court of Appeal specifically limited its holding to a vested rights claim to conduct a surface mining operation subject to the diminishing asset doctrine.  Therefore, it is not clear whether this decision has any broader application or implication beyond the facts of this case.

Wagner Farms, Inc. v. Modesto Irrigation District (Dec.6, 2006, F049966) __ Cal.App.4th __ http://www.courtinfo.ca.gov/opinions/

By Maria Pracher

In this case, the appellate court reversed an award of costs in favor of the Modesto Irrigation District (the District) granted by the trial court after the plaintiff's petition for a writ of mandate was denied.  The court found the District had failed to provide sufficient justification for the "unusually high" cost per page for preparing the record and to adequately document the time legitimately charged for assembling the record of the proceedings.

Wolfe v. City of Fremont (Oct. 31, 2006, A112386) __ Cal.App.4^th __ http://www.courtinfo.ca.gov/opinions/

By Julie Austin

This Court of Appeals’ decision under the Brown Act, which prohibits a majority of members of a local legislative body from reaching a “collective concurrence” outside a noticed public meeting, suggests that an improper consensus may be reached inadvertently during the course of individual conversations between members of a local legislative body.  The court found that the plaintiff alleged sufficient facts to demonstrate that an improper “collective concurrence” had occurred through a series of one-on-one conversations among the legislative members.  Specifically, the plaintiff alleged that all city council members expressed support for a policy before a formal public meeting and that at least one council member had been aware of the other members’ views.  The court noted that the city council’s lack of intent to create a consensus was not fatal to the plaintiff’s case because the Brown Act prohibits even unintentional “collective concurrences.”  This case suggests that in the future, while engaging in otherwise permissible one-on-one discussions with other members of a legislative body, local legislators must be careful not to reveal the views of any other members to avoid inadvertently creating an improper “collective concurrence.”

Western Placer Citizens for an Agricultural and Rural Environment v. County of Placer (3^rd Dist. Nov. 9, 2006)

By Maria Pracher and Julie Austin

In this new California Environmental Quality Act (CEQA) case, the Court of Appeal upheld the County's EIR for a sand, gravel, and granite mining and processing project.  The court ruled on two important issues.  First, the County did not violate CEQA by failing to include and analyze a slightly revised project description submitted by the applicant after the final environmental impact report (EIR) had been prepared.  Coupled with this holding, the court found that the County's decision not to prepare additional environmental review of the revised project was supported by substantial evidence in the record.  Second, the court determined that the EIR's water supply analysis was adequate.  The court also found that the plaintiff had exhausted its administrative remedies.

Citizens for Open Government v. City of Lodi (3^rd Dist. Nov. 9, 2006)

By Julie Austin

Two non-profit groups, Citizens for Open Government (Citizens) and Lodi First, opposed the City of Lodi’s certification of a Final Environmental Impact Report (FEIR) and approval of a use permit for a Wal-Mart-anchored shopping center.  The trial court found that Citizens had not exhausted all of its administrative remedies because, even though Lodi First filed an appeal to the City Council, Citizens had not filed its own appeal.  The Court of Appeals reversed this determination and found that Citizens had exhausted its administrative remedies under CEQA and the Municipal Code because Citizens appeared before the City Council to file its own objections and participated in the administrative process.  The court also found that Citizens’ claims were not moot even though a trial court had partially granted Lodi First’s petition and vacated the City Council’s approval of the project.

By John Scheuring

Late in September, the Court of Appeal effectively reversed a judgment against the City of San Diego which, with interest and attorney's fees, was on track to exceed $150 million.  Originally filed in 1995, Border Business Park sued the City on theories of inverse condemnation and breach of contract.  The trial court ruled that the City was liable for (i) publicly announcing that it was considering a proposal for to create an international airport in Otay Mesa (which interfered with sales of property within Border Business Park), and (ii) the City's diversion of truck traffic to a new border crossing with Mexico (which allegedly interfered with access to Border Business Park). The trial court also held the City liable for breach of a development agreement with the Border Business Park (but did grant a motion for new trial on res judicata issues stemming from a previous lawsuit).

Preciado v. Wilde, California Court of Appeal, Second District, 42 Cal.Rptr.3d 792, 06 Cal. Daily Op. Serv. 3817, 2006 Daily Journal D.A.R. 5563

By Brenna Moorhead

Tenants in common have equal possessory rights in land, therefore more is required to establish title by adverse possession against a cotenant that by adverse possession against a stranger. In Preciado v. Wilde, Plaintiff Preciado and his wife filed an action to quiet title based on adverse possession against Wilde, Preciado's niece. Preciado and Wilde became tenants in common when Wilde inherited interests in two parcels of real property from her father after his death in 1984. 

Establishing title by adverse possession against a stranger requires:

1. actual possession providing reasonable notice to the owner;
2. possession hostile to the owner's title;
3. a claim to the property under color of title or claim of right;
4. five years of continuous, uninterrupted possession; and
5. payment of taxes levied and assessed upon the property during the period. 

Adverse possession against a cotenant requires more with respect to notice of the intent to oust the co-tenant of its interest in the common property. One tenant cannot by mere exclusive possession acquire title of the property.

Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., et al. v. City of Turlock

By Michael Wilmar and Michael Leake

In Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., et al. v. City of Turlock, (2006) 138 Cal.App.4th 273, the California Court of Appeal for the Fifth Appellate District upheld a City of Turlock zoning ordinance which amended the City's general plan to bar the development of “big box” retail stores containing full service grocery departments. Under the ordinance, the City banned the development of “discount superstores,” which it defined as discount stores that exceed 100,000 square fee of gross floor area and devote at least 5 percent of the total sales floor area to the sale of nontaxable merchandise, often in the form of a full-service grocery department. In Wal-Mart's appeal of its earlier Superior Court defeat, it argued that the ordinance was an unconstitutional use of the City's police power and that the ordinance failed to comply with the California Environmental Quality Act (CEQA).

By Donna Jones

The California Court of Appeal in Trancas Property Owners Association v. City of Malibu, 2006 WL 802483 (Cal.App. 2 Dist.)), upon a rehearing requested by the California League of Cities as Amicus Curiae, recently re-affirmed its decision (discussed in this blog on October 13, 2005) that the City's adoption of a settlement agreement in a closed session violated the Ralph M. Brown Act, Gov't Code section 54950 et seq. (Brown Act).

By Michael Cato

If you own property near a military installation, you may want to obtain a copy of the Advisory Planning Handbook soon to be issued by the Governor's Office of Planning and Research (OPR). Or, you can participate in one of the workshops on the issue being scheduled by OPR. The purpose of the Advisory Planning Handbook is to "promote land use compatibility near military installations." While technically the Handbook is intended to serve only as a "guideline," project opponents often interpret such "guidelines" as regulations that govern a property's allowable uses. As a result, developers or other owners of property near any military installation should review and comment on the draft to assure that the guidelines that appear in the final Advisory Planning Handbook are not overly restrictive.

By Donna Jones

The California Court of Appeal recently re-affirmed the limits on a city's ability to contract away its police power and placed limits on actions that a government can take in closed session. The Court also re-affirmed development agreements as an appropriate method for a city and an owner-developer to exempt a described development from future changes in zoning and density requirements.

By Michael Wilmar

Former Section 6307 permitted the State Lands Commission to make exchanges of tide and submerged terminating the public trust for commerce, navigation, and fishery in the best interests of the state for the following purposes:

• Improvement of navigation
• Aid in reclamation
• Flood control protection
• To enhance the configuration of the shoreline for the improvement of the water and upland on navigable rivers, sloughs, streams, lakes, bays, estuaries, inlets, or straits

On Wednesday, August 24, 2005, the California Supreme Court granted the petitions for review filed by the City of Long Beach and Developers Diversified Realty Corporation, the developer of the Queensway Bay Development Project in Long Beach. This action invalidates the opinion of the Court of Appeal in California Earth Corps v. California State Lands Commission (3rd Dist. 2005) 128 Cal.App. 4th 756. The court of appeal had ruled that the California State Lands Commission had only limited authority under Section 6307 of the Public Resources Code to exchange tidelands held in public trust for lands not held in public trust.

For more information please contact a member of the Real Estate and Construction Law Blog Editorial Team.

By Doug Van Gessel

On August 4 the California Supreme Court ruled, in Grafton Partners v. Superior Court (Pricewaterhouse Coopers LLP), 2005 DJDAR 9387 that California contractual provisions in which the parties thereto pre-agree to waive the right to a trial by jury are unenforceable. The unanimous opinion stated that a right to a jury trial is a fundamental constitutional entitlement that cannot be waived in advance of a dispute between the contracting parties unless such a waiver is permitted by statute. Thus, the court has left the door open for the legislature to pass a statute allowing such waivers, and the forum for interests pursuing this debate will likely shift to the legislature now.

By Donna Jones

The San Diego Board of Supervisors approved a Transportation Impact Fee (TIF) that threatens to cripple commercial and industrial development in the unincorporated areas.

By Rafael F. Muilenberg and Donna Jones

"Conversion" of industrial properties to residential use, and "collocation" of residential units near industrial or commercial uses, has attracted concern from some industrial users and environmentalists.

Yet given the housing crisis and the scarcity of residential land available, urban infill and other "smart growth" developments are vital -- and, by their nature, are often located near other uses, including industrial.

Horwitz v. City of Los Angeles (Beglari)
124 Cal. App. 4th 1344 (2d Dist. Dec. 15, 2004) (review filed Jan. 24, 2005)

Trial court properly issued writ commanding the City to revoke all building permits and the certificate of occupancy related to a particular residence where permits were issued in violation of mandatory requirements of zoning ordinance. Los Angeles Planning Commission's ruling in favor of resident - which allowed renovation to the residence to encroach approximately 14 feet into the area of the required front-yard setback - was clearly erroneous because City has no discretion to issue a permit in the absence of compliance with the mandatory set-back requirements.

For more information please contact a member of the Real Estate and Construction Law Blog Editorial Team.

Housing shortages throughout California and the economic and social needs of local communities have sparked a growing interest in infill housing, which is higher density housing, often created in the midst of existing neighborhoods. Infill housing can involve the creation or modification of condominiums, apartments, townhouses, and single-family homes. Infill housing represents not only a response to a housing shortage but also an attempt to address other problems facing California communities. Successful infill housing can only be achieved, however, by understanding the problems, needs, and limitations of each individual community.

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For more information please contact a member of the Real Estate and Construction Law Blog Editorial Team.

CEQA:The Environmental Quality Act

(June 29, 2004) 04 C.D.O.S. 5877

By Lori Wider

Introduction

The decision of the Fourth Appellate District in this case reflects a common sense approach to implementing CEQA and its requirements. In upholding an EIR prepared by the City of Irvine for development of the Northern Sphere project on a 7,743-acre site located northeast of the former Marine Corps Air Station at El Toro, the California Court of Appeal agreed with the trial court and rejected all of Petitioner's claims that the EIR was inadequate and should be set aside. Petitioner Defend the Bay raised a number of issues under the following three primary grounds.